In this paper we study the N-player nonzero-sum Dynkin game (N ≥ 3) in continuous time, which is a non-cooperative game where the strategies are stopping times. We show that the game has a Nash equilibrium point for general payoff processes.
Introduction
A Dynkin game is a game where the controllers make use of stopping times as control actions. Actually assume one has N players denoted by π 1 , ..., π N and each of which is allowed, according to its advantages, to stop the evolution of a system. The system can be for example an option contract which binds several agents (players) in a financial market.
So for i = 1, ..., N , assume that the player π i makes the decision to stop the system at τ i , then its corresponding yield is given by:
where R i := min{τ j , j = i} and X i , Q i , Y i are stochastic processes described precisely below. This yield depends actually on whether π i is the first to stop the evolution of the * Université du Maine, LMM, Avenue Olivier Messiaen, 72085 Le Mans, Cedex 9, France. e-mail:
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system or not. So the main problem we are interested in is to find a Nash equilibrium point in the construction of the of the NEP of the nonzero-sum Dynkin game. The approximating scheme and its main properties are introduced in Section 3. Finally in Section 4, we show that the limit of the approximating scheme is a NEP for the game.
Setting of the problem and hypotheses
Throughout this paper T is a positive real constant which stands for the horizon of the problem and (Ω, F, P) is a fixed probability space on which is defined a filtration F := (F t ) t≤T which satisfies the usual conditions, i.e., it is complete and right continuous.
Next for any stopping time θ ≤ T , let us denote by:
(i) T θ the set of F-stopping times τ such that P-a.s. τ ∈ [θ, T ];
(ii) E θ [.] the conditional expectation w.r.t. Next an F-progressively measurable IR-valued stochastic process (ζ t ) t≤T is called of class [D] if the set of random variables {ζ τ , τ ∈ T 0 } is uniformly integrable. Now for i = 1, ..., N , let us introduce F-progressively measurable and IR-valued stochastic processes of class [D], 
The processes X i , Y i and Q i verify:
Note that assumptions (A1)-(A3) are minimal in order to solve the problem, as for [A4],
it is satisfied for e.g. for any i ∈ J and τ ∈ T 0 , P-a.s. on (τ < T ):
Next for T 1 , T 2 , · · · , T N elements of T 0 and for i ∈ J , let us define
the payoff associated with the player i, as follows:
where
The meaning of those payoffs in this nonzero-sum Dynkin game framework is the following:
Assume that for any i = 1, ..., N , the player π i makes the decision to use the stopping time T i as a strategy of stopping. Let i 0 ∈ J , then:
if it decides unilaterally to stop controlling first. As for the other players π j , j = i 0 , each one will receive an amount which equals to .
We next precise the notion of equilibrium that we are looking for.
Definition 2.2 We say that
N is a Nash equilibrium point of the Nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with (J i ) i∈J if for all i = 1, · · · , N and all T 1 , · · · , T N ∈ T 0 we have:
The definition means that when the equilibrium is reached, is penalized each one of the players which makes the decision to change unilaterally its strategy of stopping. ✷
Next to begin with we give a result which in way is a streamline in order to construct a NEP for the nonzero-sum Dynkin game. Actually we have:
Then the N -uplet of stopping times (τ * i ) i=1,N is a Nash equilibrium point for the nonzerosum Dynkin game associated with (J i ) i∈J . Moreover for any i ∈ J ,
Proof: Actually for any i ∈ J , since (W i t∧R ) t≤T is a martingale then
But taking into account the equalities of (iii) we get:
Making now the substitution in (2.3) we deduce that:
On the other hand since (W i t∧R i
) t≤T is an F-supermatingale then for any stopping time γ ∈ T 0 we have,
But once more
Plugging now this last term in (2.4) and since W i γ 1 1 {γ<R i } ≥ X i γ 1 1 {γ<R i } we obtain:
Thus the N -uplet of stopping times (τ * i ) i=1,N is a Nash equilibrium for the nonzero-sum Dynkin game.
To tackle the game problem, we mainly use the notion of Snell envelope of processes which we introduce briefly now. For more details on this subject one can refer e.g. to El-Karoui [9] or Dellacherie and Meyer [7] . Theorem 1 ( [7] , pp. 431 or [9] , pp. 140) : Let U = (U t ) 0≤t≤T be an F-adapted IR-valued RCLL process that belongs to class [D] . Then there exists Z := (Z t ) 0≤t≤T an F-adapted IR-valued RCLL process of class [D] , such that Z is the smallest super-martingale which 
(ii) If the predictable jumps of U are only positive, then the stopping time
is optimal, i.e.,
As a by-product of (2.6) we have Z τ * = U τ * and the process (Z t∧τ * ) t≤T is a martingale.
The approximating scheme and its properties
We are now going to introduce sequences of stopping times which, as we will show it later, converge to a NEP of the game. So let us consider the sequence of F-stopping times (τ n ) n≥1
defined, by induction, as follows:
(ii) For n ≥ N + 1, let (i, q) = (i n , q n ) ∈ IN 2 be such that n = N q + i with 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Then let us set:
Remark 3.1 As a direct consequence of the above definitions and the properties of the Snell
envelope, the following relations or properties hold true: for any n ≥ N + 1, (i) W n is RCLL and for any t ≥ θ n ,
(iii) since the predictable jumps of U n are only positive and taking into account Assumption (A3), we deduce from Theorem 1-(ii) that µ n is optimal, i.e.,
(iv) Let n = N q + i where the pair (i, q) is as above, therefore even if this is not explicitly mentioned in the definition, the stopping time θ n = θ N q+i depends on i. The same happens for U n , τ n , µ n and W n . ✷ Additionally we have:
Proof: Actually suppose there exists m ≥ 1 such that P [τ m < µ m+N ] > 0 and let us set
Then we obviously have n ≥ N + 1. Next on the set {τ n < µ n+N } we have:
. But the definition of n implies that µ n+N −1 ≤ τ n−1 and then
and from (3.1) and the definition of θ n+N −1 we deduce that θ n+N −1 = τ n . It follows that:
The strict inequality stems from (3.1) as for the equality it holds true since µ n+N −1 ≤ θ n+N −1 = τ n and τ n < τ n+N −1 .
since from (3.1) for any k = 1, ..., N − 1 we have τ n < τ n+k and from (3.2) τ n < τ n−1 . But once more the definitions of n and τ n+N −2 imply that:
As we know that τ n+N −2 > τ n then τ n+N −2 = τ n−2 > τ n .
Repeating now this procedure as many times as necessary we deduce that for any j = 1, . . . , N − 1,
and then on the set {τ n < µ n+N } we have τ n < θ n+N = θ n and thanks to the definitions of n and τ n we also have on Γ := {τ n < µ n+N } τ n = µ n 1 {µn<θn} + τ n−N 1 {µn=θn} = µ n since µ n ≤ τ n−N . Therefore on the set Γ ∈ F τn we have U n = U n+N since θ n+N = θ n and
and then µ n+N ≤ µ n on Γ since µ n+N is the first time that W n+N reaches U n+N . As on Γ we have µ n = τ n < µ n+N then this is contradictory with the previous inequality. It follows that P [Γ] = 0 and for any m ≥ 1 we have µ m+N ≤ τ m , P-a.s.. The proof is complete.
As a by-product we obtain:
Proof: Indeed, (i) is a direct consequence of the previous proposition and the definition of τ n . As for (ii), we have
But τ n 1 1 {τn<θn} = µ n 1 1 {µn<θn} and on [τ n ≥ θ n ] we have θ n = µ n . Therefore θ n 1 1 {τn≥θn} = µ n 1 1 {τn≥θn} . Gathering now those relations yields µ n = τ n ∧ θ n . Finally the second equality is just the definition of θ n .
Existence of a Nash equilibrium point
For any i ∈ {1, · · · , N }, let us define:
Those limits exist since for any n ≥ N + 1, we know that τ n ≤ τ n−N therefore the sequences (τ N n+i ) n≥0 are non-increasing for fixed i.
We have also, for all i ∈ {1, · · · , N }
We are going now to show that the N -uplet of stopping times (T * i ) i=1,...,N is a Nash equilibrium point for the N-players nonzero-sum Dynkin game associated with (J i ) i∈J .
The proof will be obtained after several intermediary results given below.
Lemma 4.1 For any n ≥ 1, i ∈ {1, · · · , N } and any θ ∈ T 0 we have:
Proof: For any n ≥ 1, i ∈ {1, · · · , N } and θ ∈ T 0 ,
and since Q i ≤ Y i we have
Therefore
since W N n+N +i is a supermartingale.
) t≤T is a martingale (Remark 2.3) and finally by (i) of Remark 3.1. Comparing now (4.3) and (4.4) to obtain the desired result.
We now focus on the limits of the terms that appear in the inequality of the previous lemma.
Lemma 4.2 : The following asymptotic inequalities hold true:
(i) For all θ ∈ T 0 and i ∈ J , we have:
(ii)
Proof: (i) Actually
As the process Y i is RCLL and of class [D] and the sequence (θ N n+N +i ) n is decreasing then, when n → ∞,
On the other hand, when n → ∞,
].
(4.7)
Actually (4.7) is obtained in paying attention whether the sequence (θ N n+N +i ) n is of stationary type or not. Going back now to (4.5), take the limit and make use of (4.6) and (4 .7) to obtain the desired result . ✷ Next let us focus on (ii). Let i ∈ J be fixed, then:
which is the desired result. Note that in the fourth inequality we have taken into account the fact that the processes X i and Y i are of RCLL and of class [D] .
An obvious consequence of Lemmata 4.1 and 4.2 is:
(4.8)
Lemma 4.3 (i) We have:
and then for all ε > 0
(ii) For all θ ∈ T 0 and all i ∈ J ,
Proof: (i) Actually let θ be the following F-stopping time:
Then using inequality (4.8) yields: (ii) Let θ be the following F-stopping time:
where the superscript ( c ) stands for the complement. Since P [θ = R * i < T ] = 0 we obtain from (4.8) and (i),
whence the desired result.
We now give a key-result which allows us to conclude.
Proposition 4.1 Under Assumption (A4)
, for all i ∈ J we have:
Proof: First note that for any i ∈ J we have:
where R * I = min{T * j ; j / ∈ I} with min ∅ = T . Therefore it is enough to show that for any i 1 , ..., i k ∈ J , which we assume w.l.o.g satisfying i 1 < i 2 < · · · < i k , we have:
Step 1: For any n ≥ 0,
Actually, first note that
On A n :
By the definitions of τ n and R * I , we have: ∀j ∈ {1, · · · , k}, ∀α / ∈ I,
Therefore in using those properties we deduce that:
Let us give briefly the justification of the second equality. Indeed for some ℓ ∈ {1, ..., N − 1}
keep it in the expression of θ N n+i j and if i j − ℓ / ∈ {i 1 , ..., i j−1 } then we know from (4.11) that, e.g., τ N n+i j −ℓ ≥ τ N n+i j−1 and then τ N n+i j −ℓ is deleted from the expression of θ N n+i j .
and τ N n+i j −ℓ is deleted from the expression of θ N n+i j . Thus we are done.
Now the first equality of (4.11) yields:
Next by a backward induction argument we have that for any j ∈ {1, · · · , k},
Actually for j = k, by (4.11) and (4.13) we have:
The last equality holds true since by monotonicity we have θ
Therefore by definition of τ N (n−1)+i k we have
property is satisfied for j = k.
Assume now that the property is satisfied for j = k, .., ℓ + 1 (2 ≤ ℓ + 1 ≤ k) and let us show it is also valid for j = ℓ. From (4.11) and (4.13) we have
On the other hand
This second equality is obtained in the same way as in (4.12) in using (4.11) and the induction hypothesis. Therefore, once more by the induction hypothesis, we have:
= θ N n+i ℓ .
It follows that
τ N n+i ℓ = τ N (n−1)+i ℓ ≥ θ N n+i ℓ = θ N (n−1)+i ℓ and then τ N (n−1)+i ℓ = τ N (n−2)+i ℓ . Thus the property is satisfied for ℓ.
Therefore for any j ∈ {1, ..., k} we have τ N n+i j = τ N (n−1)+i j ≥ θ N n+i j = θ N (n−1)+i j which implies that A n ⊂ A n−1 , for any n ≥ 1 and then P (A n ) = 0 for any n ≥ 0 since P (A 0 ) = 0. ✷
Step 2: To proceed let n ≥ 0 and ε > 0, then we have: Finally we have the following result related to Proposition 2.1 which is a direct consequence of the fact that (T * i ) i∈J is a NEP for the nonzero-sum Dynkin game and, Proposition 1 and Remark 2.3 and Proposition 4.1. 
